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Playing Hot Potato in the Market:  
The Ninth Circuit’s Better Approach to 
Calculating Loss for Securities Fraud 
Sentencing 
Erica Connolly* 
In United States v. Berger, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit departed from 
the Second and Fifth Circuits regarding the standard required to determine loss for 
securities fraud under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Unlike its sister circuits, the 
Ninth Circuit held that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. 
Broudo for loss causation in civil securities fraud actions did not apply to the criminal 
sentencing context. Instead, the Ninth Circuit endorsed price inflation, which was 
rejected in Dura Pharmaceuticals, as a method of determining loss under the 
Guidelines. This Note examines the circuits’ decisions in light of the crime and 
punishment of securities fraud and concludes that the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning better 
accords with the culpability of securities fraud offenders.   
 
 * J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2012. I am very 
appreciative to Professor Aaron Rappaport for helping me untangle the world of loss calculation; his 
patience and feedback were invaluable. I would also like to thank the Hastings Law Journal editors 
who made excellent suggestions to improve this Note. Finally, I have to thank my parents, who have 
consistently shown me great support, even as I made them listen to securities law explanations. Their 
forbearance is an attribute to which we should all aspire. 
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Introduction 
The past decade and a half have seen tremendous shifts in American 
securities markets. From the dot-com bubble and its burst to the recent 
subprime mortgage catastrophe, the markets have reached incredible 
heights and then rapidly plummeted.1 At their pinnacle, Enron’s shares 
traded in August 2000 at just over $90 per share.2 By December 2001, 
their price was less than $1, and the company had filed for bankruptcy.3 
WorldCom and Dynegy experienced similarly dramatic rises and 
 
 1. See Stephen P. Utkus, Vanguard Research, Market Bubbles and Investor Psychology 
(2011). 
 2. See Bethany McLean & Peter Elkind, The Smartest Guys in the Room: The Amazing Rise 
and Scandalous Fall of Enron 318 (2003). 
 3. Id. at 403, 405. 
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precipitous falls.4 More recently, BearStearns, AIG, and Lehman 
Brothers have undergone dramatic changes in fortune.5 
The architects of these calamities have faced criminal convictions 
and headline-grabbing sentences.6 Bernard Ebbers was convicted for his 
role in the scheme to artificially inflate WorldCom’s shares and was 
sentenced to twenty-five years,7 at the time the longest sentence for a 
corporate officer convicted of securities fraud.8 Jeffrey Skilling, Enron’s 
CEO at the time of its financial collapse, received twenty-four years.9 
Bernard Madoff pled guilty to numerous counts of securities fraud, mail 
and wire fraud, and falsifying records, and received a sentence of 150 
years.10 For many, these long sentences represent an appropriate 
comeuppance for the once high-flying executives.11 
Several factors, including changes in the political and public 
climates, contribute to the determination of these long sentences.12 But 
the most important factor by far is the loss sustained from the fraud, 
because under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (the “Guidelines”) loss 
is the primary enhancement factor.13 Loss dwarfs other enhancements, 
making the loss calculation the most important determinant in 
sentencing.14 
In 2009, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit diverged from 
the Second and Fifth Circuits regarding the appropriate standard for 
calculating loss for criminal sentences.15 The Second and Fifth Circuits 
adopted the Supreme Court’s civil loss calculation reasoning from Dura 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo to establish standards for criminal 
 
 4. See Jamie Doward, Day the WorldCom World Was Turned Upside Down: The Giant’s Fall, 
Observer, June 30, 2002, at 4; Shocks to the System: Will the Light Keep Burning in America This 
Summer?, Economist, Aug. 10, 2002, at 54–55.  
 5. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Too Big to Fail: The Inside Story of How Wall Street and 
Washington Fought to Save the Financial System—and Themselves 5–6, 355–63, 392–408 (2010). 
 6. See, e.g., Alexei Barrionuevo, Skilling Sentenced to 24 Years, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 2006, at C1; 
Carrie Johnson, Ebbers Gets 25-Year Sentence for Role in WorldCom Fraud, Wash. Post, July 14, 
2005, at A1; Kevin McCoy, As Victims Cheer, “Evil” Madoff Gets 150 Years: Judge Cites “Staggering 
Human Toll” of Scam, U.S.A. Today, June 30, 2009, at A1. But see Gretchen Morgenson & Louise 
Story, A Financial Crisis with Little Guilt, N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 2011, at A1. 
 7. Johnson, supra note 6. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Barrionuevo, supra note 6. 
 10. McCoy, supra note 6. 
 11. See, e.g., Barrionuevo, supra note 6; Diana B. Henriques, Madoff, Apologizing, Is Given 150 
Years, N.Y. Times, June 30, 2009, at A1. 
 12. See Bosses Behind Bars, Economist, June 12, 2004, at 59–60 (noting how the changes in the 
Guidelines emerged from Congress’s reaction to the widespread damage from Enron-type frauds). 
 13. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B1.1(b)(1) (2010); Derick R. Vollrath, Losing 
the Loss Calculation: Toward a More Just Sentencing Regime in White-Collar Criminal Cases, 59 Duke 
L.J. 1001, 1008 (2010). 
 14. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B1.1(b)(1). 
 15. Compare United States v. Berger, 587 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 2009), with United States v. 
Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170, 180 (2d Cir. 2007), and United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 546 (5th Cir. 2005). 
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sentencing.16 The Ninth Circuit asserted that the retributive, society-
based rationale for criminal punishment differed from the civil purpose 
of compensation and refused to apply Dura Pharmaceuticals’ reasoning 
to criminal sentencing.17 The circuits’ disagreement embodies a broader 
conflict about determining white-collar criminals’ culpability: Are they 
responsible for creating a virtual game of hot potato in the market, or are 
they only responsible for the losses sustained by the shareholders holding 
the shares when word of the fraud gets out and the game ends? 
This Note addresses these competing theories for loss calculation 
under the Guidelines and argues that the Ninth Circuit’s approach more 
accurately identifies the defendant’s culpability and is the better 
approach. This Note is divided into three main Parts. Through a brief 
examination of the crime of securities fraud and the rationales underlying 
its prohibition, Part I assesses the policy implications instructing courts. 
Part II analyzes the punishment regimes in place under the Guidelines. 
Part III analyzes the different theories of loss calculation in light of these 
regimes, and ultimately advises that with certain modifications the Ninth 
Circuit’s interpretation is the more appropriate standard for determining 
loss. 
I.  The Crime 
To contextualize the circuit split, this Part introduces the law 
prohibiting securities fraud and briefly details the policies underlying its 
criminalization. 
A. The Law 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”)18 governs 
transactions on the secondary markets. The Act has numerous antifraud 
provisions, which prohibit insider trading and material misrepresentations 
in offers and sales of securities.19 Loss calculation standards are 
particularly significant in sentencing for material misrepresentations 
because loss is often market-wide and can be substantial.20 Calculating 
 
 16. See Rutkoske, 506 F.3d at 180 (discussing Dura Pharm., Inc., v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 
(2005)); Olis, 429 F.3d at 546 (same). 
 17. Berger, 587 F.3d at 1043. 
 18. Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2010)). 
 19. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2010) (prohibiting material misrepresentations); 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.10b-5 (2011) (prohibiting insider trading). 
 20. Compare Ebbers’ twenty-five year sentence for a conviction for affirmative 
misrepresentations about the health of WorldCom with the sentencing imposed on Rex Shelby, an 
Enron employee who pled guilty to insider trading. Laurel Brubaker Calkins, Ex-Enron Broadband 
Executive Sentenced for Insider Trading, Bus. Wk. (Mar. 28, 2011, 1:07 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/ 
news/2011-03-28/ex-enron-broadband-executive-sentenced-for-insider-trading.html. Shelby sold his 
Enron shares immediately after he had misrepresented the profits Enron was generating. As an 
employee he had a duty to disclose the information he knew to the buyer of the shares. Id. He was 
Connolly_63-HLJ-567 (Do Not Delete) 1/24/2012 6:29 PM 
January 2012]       PLAYING HOT POTATO IN THE MARKET 571 
standards for market-wide manipulation is the center of the divergent 
treatment of sentencing among the circuit courts of appeals.21 This Note, 
therefore, focuses on the prohibitions against material misrepresentations 
to the market. 
Section 10b of the Exchange Act prohibits the use, “in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security . . . , [of] any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance.”22 Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) Rule 10b-5, promulgated under the Act’s antifraud provision, 
elaborates on the types of prohibited conduct.23 Section 10b and Rule 
10b-5 are catch-all antifraud provisions.24 They reach beyond the parties 
to a transaction and prohibit broad swaths of conduct involving 
misleading or false information.25 Corporate directors or officers who 
issue misleading or false information about a corporation can be 
criminally and civilly liable under the Act, even if they refrain from 
directly engaging in sales or purchases of stock.26 
The SEC has primary responsibility for investigating violations of 
the Exchange Act.  The SEC is limited to pursuing civil actions against 
offenders, but it can refer investigations to the Department of Justice for 
criminal prosecution. 27 The Exchange Act establishes criminal liability 
for willful violations of its provisions, with a maximum sentence of 
twenty years and a maximum fine of $5 million.28 Criminal prosecution 
requires a showing that the defendant intentionally made a materially 
misleading or false statement in connection with the purchase or sale of a 
security.29 Unlike a private plaintiff, who must show reasonable reliance 
 
sentenced to three months in a halfway house, three months of house arrest, two years of probation, 
and he will forfeit the profits he realized from the transaction. Id. 
 21. See Berger, 587 F.3d at 1040–41 (concerning a defendant who spread misinformation about his 
company’s liabilities); Rutkoske, 506 F.3d at 173 (defendant misrepresented the nature of the company 
and the nature of the brokers’ commissions); Olis, 429 F.3d at 542 (defendant mischaracterized 
liabilities as cash transactions). 
 22. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
 23. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
 24. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 174 
(1994) (“Section 10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision . . . .” (quoting United States v. 
Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 234–35 (1980))). 
 25. Id. 
 26. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968) (“Rule 10b-5 is violated 
whenever assertions are made . . . in a manner reasonably calculated to influence the investing 
public . . . if such assertions are false or misleading or are so incomplete as to mislead irrespective of 
whether the issuance of the release was motivated by corporate officials for ulterior purposes.”). 
 27. Marc I. Steinberg & Ralph C. Ferrara, Securities Practice: Federal and State 
Enforcement § 7.15 (2d ed. 2010). 
 28. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2010). 
 29. United States v. Goyal, 629 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Smith, 155 
F.3d 1051, 1063 (9th Cir. 1998)); cf. SEC v. Monarch Funding Corp., 192 F.3d 295, 308 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(“To have violated section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, [the defendant] must have: (1) made a material 
misrepresentation or a material omission as to which he had a duty to speak, or used a fraudulent 
device; (2) with scienter; (3) in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.”); SEC v. 
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and actual damages30 to recover under the Exchange Act’s implied civil 
cause of action,31 the government need only establish the “impact of the 
scheme on the investor.”32 
The Exchange Act requires the government to show the party acted 
“willfully” in violating the provision.33 A “willful” act is “intentional, 
deliberate, and not the result of an innocent mistake, negligence, or 
inadvertence”34 but does not require knowledge that the action was a 
violation.35 The crux of the “willful” showing is the defendant’s 
knowledge the action was wrong, but not necessarily that the defendant 
knew it was illegal.36 
B. The Policies 
The decision to criminally prosecute for securities fraud often has 
political motivations, with the types of victims and the nature of the fraud 
playing significant roles.37 The choice to prosecute also highlights the 
opposing policies and motivations that often underlie the criminalization 
of securities fraud and that influence the debate about culpability and 
punishment. Punishment schemes must balance these opposing views of 
the culpability of white-collar crime. The courts rely on and must balance 
these justifications when expanding and contracting the sentences for 
white-collar criminals.38 
Federal securities laws address the potentially substantial harms that 
individual shareholders suffer as a result of securities fraud.39 At the 
sentencing hearing of Jeffrey Skilling, Judge Simeon Lake noted, “As the 
many victims have testified, [Skilling’s] crimes have imposed on 
 
Haligiannis, 470 F. Supp. 2d 373, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Courts have applied collateral estoppel in the 
securities fraud context because the elements necessary to establish civil liability under . . . 10(b) are 
identical to those necessary to establish criminal liability under . . . 10(b).”). 
 30. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005). 
 31. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) (“It is now 
established that a private right of action is implied under § 10(b).”). 
 32. Palmer T. Heenan et al., Securities Fraud, 47 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1015, 1043 (2010) (footnote 
omitted) (citing United States v. Amick, 439 F.2d 351, 359 n.12 (7th Cir. 1971)). 
 33. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a). It is less clear whether this level of intent is distinct from the level of 
intent required for civil actions. See Heenan, supra note 32, at 1026. 
 34. Heenan, supra note 32, at 1025. 
 35. United States v. Reyes, 577 F.3d 1069, 1080 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[O]ur circuit and others have 
rejected the argument that, in the context of securities fraud statutes, willfulness requires a defendant 
know that he or she was breaking the law.” (citing United States v. Tarallo, 380 F.3d 1174, 1187–88 
(9th Cir. 2004))). 
 36. Id. at 1079 (citing Tarallo, 380 F.3d at 1088). 
 37. See Miriam H. Baer, Linkage and the Deterrence of Corporate Fraud, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1295, 
1297–98 (2008) (discussing the cycle of legislation and punishment following corporate scandals). 
 38. See id.; Ellen S. Podgor, Throwing Away the Key, 116 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 279, 283–84 
(2007). 
 39. J. Scott Dutcher, Comment, From the Boardroom to the Cellblock: The Justifications for 
Harsher Punishment of White-Collar and Corporate Crime, 37 Ariz. St. L.J. 1295, 1299 (2005). 
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hundreds if not thousands a life sentence of poverty.”40 Judge Denny 
Chin justified Bernard Madoff’s 150-year sentence by stating, “The 
message must be sent that Mr. Madoff’s crimes were extraordinarily evil 
and that this kind of irresponsible manipulation of the system is not 
merely a bloodless financial crime that takes place just on paper, but that 
it is . . . one that takes a staggering human toll.”41 
In addition, outlawing manipulation and deception in securities 
transactions is an attempt to protect market integrity. “Fraud is bad,” as 
one commentator pithily noted,42 but an act of securities fraud generally 
impacts far more people than an act of common law fraud.43 Securities 
fraud destabilizes the market, making investors skittish about investment 
and reducing liquidity in the market.44 Stocks become either overvalued 
because of the fraudulent acts or undervalued because of fear of fraud.45 
Overall, the market becomes less efficient as market participants attempt 
to account for potentially fraudulent schemes.46 
The goal of protecting market integrity is apparent from the 
Exchange Act’s history. Congress enacted the Securities Act of 193347 
and the Exchange Act against the backdrop of the 1929 market crash and 
subsequent Great Depression, which affected the entire American 
population. 48 Unemployment reached twenty-five percent; repossessions 
of houses and cars bought on credit were rampant.49 The Acts were not 
just a way to protect investments, but also a way to prevent “[n]ational 
emergencies, which produce widespread unemployment and the 
dislocation of trade, transportation, and industry.”50 
However, despite the potential for widespread substantial harm to 
the market and to individual investors, white-collar criminals 
traditionally received lighter sentences because the public perceived 
them to be less culpable than other types of criminals.51 As one 
commentator noted, “The American public generally has not been 
fearful of being victimized by white-collar crime.”52 Impersonal economic 
 
 40. Barrionuevo, supra note 6 (quoting U.S. District Court Judge Simeon T. Lake III). 
 41. McCoy, supra note 6 (quoting U.S. District Court Judge Denny Chin). 
 42. Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 775, 824 (2006). 
 43. See id. at 824–26 (arguing that securities fraud creates an inefficient market). 
 44. Id. at 824. 
 45. Id. at 825. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77bbbb (2010)). 
 48. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 347, 
348 (1991); Stanley K. Schultz, Crashing Hopes: The Great Depression, American History 102, 
http://us.history.wisc.edu/hist102/lectures/lecture18.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2011). 
 49. See About the Great Depression, Dep’t of Eng., U. Ill. Urbana-Champaign, 
http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/depression/about.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2011). 
 50. 15 U.S.C. § 78b(4) (2010). 
 51. Dutcher, supra note 39, at 1301. 
 52. Id. 
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crimes are seemingly less dangerous than the confrontational nature of 
“street crimes.”53 Moreover, critics have argued that white-collar crime 
unjustly conflates tort and criminal liabilities, and that white-collar 
criminals should be liable only for tort violations.54 Others argue that 
white-collar criminals have skills that benefit society and therefore long 
sentences do not serve utilitarian goals.55 
II.  The Punishment 
The tensions underlying the criminality of securities fraud—
protecting individual investors, ensuring market reliability, and 
preventing over-punishment—also influence its punishment regime.56 
The Guidelines represent the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s attempt to 
adequately punish defendants and to effectively deter future criminal 
conduct.57 
Violators face three different forms of liability: private civil actions 
by shareholders;58 civil actions by the SEC;59 and criminal conviction, 
imprisonment, or fines.60 This Part considers the criminal punishment 
regime, beginning with a brief overview of the history of the Guidelines 
for white-collar crime, followed by a description of the current guidelines. 
A. History 
Congress created the Sentencing Commission under the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 198461 and charged it with establishing a uniform federal 
sentencing policy to eliminate disparities in offenders’ sentences.62 The 
Sentencing Commission drafted guidelines through which judges would 
determine the severity of the crime and the offender’s criminal history.63 
 
 53. See id.; Podgor, supra note 38, at 283–84. 
 54. Michael Kades, Exercising Discretion: A Case Study of Prosecutorial Discretion in the 
Wisconsin Department of Justice, 25 Am. J. Crim. L. 115, 116–17 (1997). 
 55. See Podgor, supra note 38, at 279; cf. Vollrath, supra note 13, at 1021 (noting that current 
punishment schemes poorly account for the characteristics of the defendant). 
 56. But see Baer, supra note 37, at 1313 (arguing that the timing of enforcement is key to 
deterring corporate fraud because ending the fraud actually aids in the detection of the fraud, thus 
incentivizing continuous wrongdoing). 
 57. See Vollrath, supra note 13, at 1006. The U.S. Sentencing Commission is an independent 
agency charged with “establish[ing] sentencing policies and practices for the federal courts, including 
guidelines to be consulted regarding the appropriate form and severity of punishment for offenders 
convicted of federal crimes.” U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 2010 Annual Report 1 (2010). 
 58. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4 (2010); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 
13 n.9 (1971). 
 59. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3). 
 60. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (2010). 
 61. Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 211–239, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987–2001 (1984) (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3586, 3601–3615, 3661–3683, 3742 and at 28 U.S.C. 991–998 (2010)). 
 62. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2010); see also U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, supra note 57, at 1. 
 63. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.1 (2010). For a plain language explanation, 
see Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They 
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As originally promulgated, the guidelines were mandatory;64 judges’ 
departures from the guidelines were subject to appellate review.65 Using 
the Commission’s sentencing grid, judges sentenced within the range 
required by the two factors.66 To determine the crime’s severity, the 
guidelines provide a base offense level derived from the type of crime, to 
which judges can add points based on specific offense characteristics.67  
When the Sentencing Commission created its initial guideline for 
white-collar criminal sentences, it specifically rejected the lax scheme 
already in place.68 Instead of the previous leniency, the Commission 
sought to create “short but definite” sentences for white-collar criminals 
because they “might deter future crime more effectively than sentences 
with no confinement condition.”69 
These “short but definite” sentences began to grow longer. In 2001, 
the Economic Crime Package70 significantly amended the Guidelines by 
merging fraud with other loss-based crimes in order to address a 
perception that white-collar sentencing remained too lenient.71 In doing 
so, the Commission made loss—and courts’ estimates of loss—the most 
significant factor in calculating white-collar defendants’ sentences.72 The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s passage in 200273 further changed the Guidelines, 
as Congress charged the Sentencing Commission with the task of 
increasing penalties for white-collar defendants to levels that would 
effectively deter future securities schemes.74 
 
Rest, 17 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 6–7 (1988). 
 64. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2010) (mandating that courts use the guideline range unless there are 
factors in the case that the Commission did not account for). The Supreme Court determined that 
section 3553(b) was unconstitutional in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244, 245 (2005), 
discussed in greater detail in Part II.B. 
 65. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2010) (detailing the considerations appellate courts must consider 
when reviewing sentences, including whether the sentence was “outside the applicable guideline 
range”). The Supreme Court also excised this section in Booker, 543 U.S. at 259. 
 66. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.1. For an example of the current guideline 
grid, see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, ch. 5 pt. A. 
 67. Id. § 1B1.1. 
 68. Breyer, supra note 63, at 20–21. 
 69. Id. at 22. 
 70. This is the blanket term for the significant amendments by the Sentencing Commission to the 
Guidelines. See Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Just in Crime: Guiding Economic Crime Reform After the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 34 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 359, 378 (2003). With the amendments, the 
Commission intended to address a perception that white-collar crime was not being punished as 
severely as other crimes. See Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 66 Fed. Reg. 30,512, 30,542 
(June 6, 2001). 
 71. Ramirez, supra note 70, at 378–79. 
 72. See id. (noting that with the consolidation, penalties for higher losses became more severe). 
 73. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, 
& 29 U.S.C.). 
 74. Ramirez, supra note 70, at 386. 
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B. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Today 
The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker changed 
the Guidelines from a mandatory sentencing scheme to advisory 
guidelines.75 Nevertheless, the guidelines remain the starting point for 
sentence determination.76 A departure, therefore, is always relative to the 
initially calculated sentence. A consideration of the current Guidelines 
for fraud reveals the importance of loss calculation to the sentence 
determination. 
For committing a crime involving “fraud and deceit,” a defendant 
convicted of securities fraud receives a sentence guided by section 2B1.1 
of the Guidelines.77 Like many of the guidelines, section 2B1.1 addresses 
several different but related crimes.78 Larceny, property damage, fraud, 
and offenses involving counterfeit instruments all fall under its 
provisions.79 Resulting loss by third parties is the common thread 
throughout these crimes and loss is the primary tool in determining the 
sentence for each.80 
Section 2B1.1 establishes two base offense levels: for offenses with 
statutory maximums of twenty years or greater, the base offense level is 
seven; for any other offense, the base offense level is six.81 Securities 
fraud has a statutory maximum of twenty years and qualifies for the 
heightened base offense level.82 The special offense characteristics add 
enhancements to this base level. The Guidelines have enhancements 
tailored for securities fraud,83 but the loss enhancement dilutes their 
 
 75. 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005) (finding that mandatory guidelines based on enhancements found by 
the judge, rather than the jury, violated defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial). 
 76.  Id. at 264. 
 77.  U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B1.1 (2010). 
 78.  Id.; see, e.g., id. § 2B3.1 (dealing with robbery, armed robbery); id. § 2G3.1 (dealing with the 
transportation of obscene matter, its provision to minors, and misleading domain names). 
 79. Id. § 2B1.1. 
 80. Id.; see also Ramirez, supra note 70, at 378–79. 
 81. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B1.1(a). 
 82. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2010). 
 83. Three special offense characteristics other than loss enhance a defendant’s sentence for 
securities fraud. First, the number of victims of the fraud also enhances the sentence. U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual § 2B1.1(b)(2). Second, if the defendant received more than $1 million from the 
fraud the level increases by two. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(14). Alternatively, the level increases by four if the 
defendant  
(i) substantially jeopardized the safety and soundness of a financial institution; 
(ii) substantially endangered the solvency or financial security of an organization that, at 
any time during the offense, (I) was a publicly traded company; or (II) had 1,000 or more 
employees; or (iii) substantially endangered the solvency or financial security of 100 or 
more victims.  
Id. However, if the defendant’s offense level is below twenty-four, engaging in either of these actions 
automatically raises the defendant’s offense level to twenty-four rather than merely adding four levels. 
Id. Finally, if the defendant was an officer or director, a registered broker or dealer, or an investment 
advisor, her offense level increases by another four levels. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(17). 
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impact.84 Under section 2B1.1, the loss enhancement starts at two offense 
levels for $5000 and increases to thirty levels for $400 million.85 Without 
adding any of the enhancements targeting securities fraud, loss 
enhancement can add between seventeen and twenty years to a 
defendant’s sentence.86 Moreover, all of the losses resulting from the 
“same course of conduct or common scheme” are relevant to the loss 
calculation.87 A defendant’s conviction on one count of securities fraud 
subjects her to punishment for all of the losses involved with that 
conviction. 
Under the Guidelines, “loss is the greater of actual loss or intended 
loss.”88 The comments define actual loss as “the reasonably foreseeable 
pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense” and intended loss as “the 
pecuniary harm . . . intended to result from the offense.”89 The comments 
further elaborate that “reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm” is the 
monetary harm the defendant “knew or . . . reasonably should have 
known, was a potential result of the offense.”90 Finally, the guidelines 
counsel that “[t]he court need only make a reasonable estimate of the 
loss . . . . based on available information” such as “[t]he approximate 
number of victims multiplied by the average loss to each victim,” “[t]he 
reduction that resulted from the offense in the value” of shares, or 
“[m]ore general factors, such as the scope and duration of the offense 
and revenues generated by similar operations.”91 
The guidelines provide little direct guidance to courts in calculating 
losses. They emphasize the use of judicial discretion: “The sentencing 
judge is in a unique position to assess the evidence and estimate the loss 
based upon that evidence.”92 
C. Reactions to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
The Guidelines’ new severity for white-collar sentences has 
provoked a variety of reactions, which highlight the culpability debates 
facing courts. For example, Derick Vollrath noted that the Guidelines’ 
directives are “unhelpful and circular” and fail to account for “thorny 
 
 84. See Peter J. Henning, White Collar Crime Sentences After Booker: Was the Sentencing of 
Bernie Ebbers Too Harsh?, 37 McGeorge L. Rev. 757, 767 (2006) (“While various modifications can 
have a small effect on the offense level for a defendant in a white collar crime case, the determination 
of loss can raise a sentence quickly from modest to substantial.”). 
 85. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B1.1(b)(1). 
 86. Depending on the loss, a defendant’s sentence, assuming no criminal history, can jump from a 
range of zero to six months to a range of 210 to 262 months. Id.  
 87. Id. § 1B1.3. 
 88. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A). 
 89. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(i)–(ii). 
 90. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(iv).  
 91. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(C). 
 92. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(C). 
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causation issues.”93 Similarly, Judge Jed Rakoff in the Southern District 
of New York opined that the Guidelines place an “inordinate emphasis” 
on the actual or intended financial loss “in an effort to appear 
‘objective’ . . . without, however, explaining why it is appropriate to 
accord such huge weight to such factors.”94 Ellen Podgor argued, “The 
accused becomes irrelevant in a sentencing world ruled by the cold 
mathematical calculations found in the [S]entencing Guidelines.”95 
Other commentators approve of the Guidelines’ method for 
determining sentences for white-collar criminals. The Guidelines’ 
harshness serves as an appropriate method of deterrence and retribution, 
argued J. Scott Dutcher, in light of the significant economic gain white-
collar crime can produce.96 Mary Kreiner Ramirez stated, “The dual 
purposes of retribution and deterrence support longer terms of 
imprisonment” to account for “the nefarious nature of economic 
crime.”97 
The Guidelines’ lack of concrete direction and the swirling policies 
and motivations for punishing securities fraud are the setting for the two 
approaches to loss calculation created by the Ninth Circuit and the 
Second and Fifth Circuits. 
III.  Loss Calculation 
The circuits’ split centers on ascertaining the loss that defendants 
cause, and the different approaches stem from a nuanced distinction in 
classifying a defendant’s culpability for securities fraud. Securities fraud 
is not a simple crime because multiple overlapping factors constantly 
influence the exchanges on which it occurs.98 Further complicating the 
courts’ handling of securities fraud is the courts’ reliance on common law 
fraud principles to fill in the broad statutory prohibitions.99 As securities 
transactions have become more complicated and nonparties have 
become liable, courts have grappled with sorting out the damage from 
fraud and the losses caused by market fluctuations.100 
The Supreme Court tackled this issue in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
v. Broudo, which addresses appropriate theories of loss in the civil 
 
 93. Vollrath, supra note 13, at 1018. 
 94. United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 95. Podgor, supra note 38, at 280. 
 96. Dutcher, supra note 39, at 1305. 
 97. Ramirez, supra note 70, at 408. 
 98. Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 811, 
820 (2009). 
 99. Id. at 840; see also Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005) (“The courts have 
implied from these statutes and Rule a private damages action, which resembles, but is not identical 
to, common-law tort actions for deceit and misrepresentation.”). 
 100. See Fisch, supra note 98, at 820–21 (describing the courts’ attempts to better define the 
causation requirement). 
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context.101 This decision, its implications, and its rationales are the 
foundation of the Ninth, Second, and Fifth Circuits’ different resolutions 
of this question. 
A. DURA PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. V. BROUDO 
Since 1946, courts have interpreted the Exchange Act to imply a 
private cause of action for plaintiffs who claim that defendants have 
injured them through fraud in the sales of securities.102 Courts have used 
common law fraud elements as the foundation for securities fraud 
claims.103 Plaintiffs must show (1) a material misrepresentation, 
(2) scienter, (3) a connection with a purchase or sale of a security, 
(4) reliance on the fraud to engage in the transaction, (5) economic harm, 
and (6) causation between the fraud and the loss the plaintiff sustained.104 
This last element requires that plaintiffs show that the fraud was a 
significant cause of the loss, not just that the fraud was the reason they 
bought the shares.105 In Dura Pharmaceuticals, the Supreme Court 
considered whether the inflated-purchase-price theory was sufficient to 
plead economic harm and proximate causation in civil actions.106 
 1. The Decision 
The plaintiffs alleged that Dura Pharmaceuticals (“Dura”) had 
made two misrepresentations: first, about one drug’s future profitability, 
and second, about the likelihood of FDA approval of another drug.107 
The plaintiffs bought shares in the company after these announcements.108 
When the first drug’s profitability did not meet Dura’s predictions, the 
share price dropped significantly.109 Eight months later, Dura announced 
that the FDA had not approved the second drug, leading to another 
drop, but the share price recovered within a week.110 
The plaintiffs filed a class action suit, using as the end date for 
identifying class members the drop in Dura’s share price resulting from 
the announcement of the first drug’s lower sales.111 Because the class’s 
end date preceded the second drop in the share prices, which resulted 
from FDA disapproval of the second drug, the plaintiffs could not allege 
 
 101. 544 U.S. at 340. 
 102. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975); Kardon v. Nat’l 
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946). 
 103. See Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 341. 
 104. See id. at 341–42. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 339. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Broudo v. Dura Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 936 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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that their losses stemmed from the price’s decline after that 
announcement.112 Instead, the plaintiffs alleged that Dura’s initial 
statement about the likelihood of the FDA approval, which inflated 
Dura’s share price, was false.113 They argued that they had suffered 
economic harm because they had relied on those false statements in 
purchasing shares at the inflated price.114 
The Ninth Circuit agreed this was a plausible theory of economic 
harm because the plaintiffs had suffered injury by paying more for the 
shares than they were worth.115 The court also agreed that pleading an 
inflated purchase price satisfied the loss-causation element because the 
misrepresentation caused the shares to be overvalued, which led to the 
plaintiffs’ injury of paying more than the actual value of the shares.116 
In a strongly worded opinion, the Supreme Court reversed, stating, 
“In our view, this statement of the law is wrong.”117 According to the 
Court, the inflated-price theory fails because at the time of the purchase, 
the buyer has not suffered a loss: she holds a share worth the price she 
paid.118 An inflated purchase price “might mean a later loss” “after the 
truth makes its way into the marketplace.”119 But the Court cautioned 
that the lower price “may reflect, not the earlier misrepresentation, but 
changed economic circumstances, changed investor expectations, new 
industry-specific or firm-specific facts, conditions, or other events, which 
taken separately or together account for some or all of that lower 
price.”120 
In reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Court pointed to the policy 
justifications for a private cause of action for securities fraud.121 Private 
enforcement serves to deter fraud by compensating shareholders for the 
economic harm they actually suffered—not by providing “investment 
insurance” for market reliability.122 The Court noted that Congress 
intended relief for shareholders only where a plaintiff has met “‘the 
burden of proving’ that the defendant’s misrepresentations ‘caused the 
loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover.’”123 The Ninth Circuit’s 
theory, by contrast, “would allow recovery where a misrepresentation 
 
 112. Id. at 940–41. 
 113. Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 339. 
 114. Id. at 340. 
 115. Broudo, 339 F.3d at 938–39. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 342. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. (emphasis removed). 
 120. Id. at 343. 
 121. Id. at 345. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 345–46 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4)). 
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leads to an inflated purchase price but nonetheless does not proximately 
cause any economic loss.”124 
 2. Analyzing Dura Pharmaceuticals 
Both the Ninth Circuit’s and the Supreme Court’s decisions began 
with discussions of the harm the shareholders had suffered, but disagreed 
about the nature of that harm.125 The Ninth Circuit found that paying an 
overvalued share price was an injury. 126 The Supreme Court rejected that 
finding because in the market, the shares are worth the inflated price;127 
the shareholder could recover the price she paid by selling to another 
market participant who relied on the same misinformation.128 
The rationale underlying the Supreme Court’s decision assumes that 
the misrepresentation has fooled the entire market. A shareholder 
suffers no harm until the truth comes out and she is stuck with shares 
that have far less value because of the fraud. In the Court’s view, the 
market is like a game of hot potato. Potatoes (shares) bounce between 
parties until the music stops—the truth gets out—and only the 
shareholder still holding the potato can recover. Of course, other factors 
may have changed the desirability of the shares, but those factors do not 
constitute damage from the fraud. 
When the Court held that an inflated purchase price could not 
constitute economic harm, it also precluded plaintiffs from using the 
inflated-purchase-price theory to show loss causation.129 The Court 
suggests that economic harm occurs when the truth reaches the market, 
and plaintiffs must show how the truth has harmed them.130 Because of 
the delay in the injury, the plaintiffs have to separate non-fraudulent 
market factors from the loss caused by the fraud.131 
In Dura Pharmaceuticals, the Court held only that the inflated-price 
theory could not be used to plead economic harm or loss causation,132 but 
the Court’s reasoning has had significant impact in lower courts. Lower 
courts have interpreted Dura Pharmaceuticals to require that in order to 
show economic harm, plaintiffs must allege that the truth was revealed to 
the market.133 Lower courts have also required analyses distinguishing 
 
 124. Id. at 346. 
 125. Compare id. at 342, with Broudo v. Dura Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 938–39 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 126. See Broudo, 339 F.3d at 939. 
 127. See Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 342. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 343–44.  
 130. Id. at 343. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 346 (“In sum, we find the Ninth Circuit’s approach inconsistent with the law’s 
requirement that a plaintiff prove that the defendant’s misrepresentation (or other fraudulent 
conduct) proximately caused the plaintiff’s economic loss. We need not, and do not, consider other 
proximate cause or loss-related questions.”). 
 133. See, e.g., Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 257–58 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that the 
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between harm caused by the fraud and harm caused by other factors in 
order to satisfy the loss-causation element.134 
The circuits have been grappling with reconciling Dura 
Pharmaceuticals’ strict rules for civil loss with the expansive criminal 
sentencing regime.135 The split created by the Ninth Circuit reflects two 
competing interpretations of Dura Pharmaceuticals’ holding negating the 
use of the inflated-price theory, which in turn stem from two approaches 
to the differing culpabilities of civil and criminal liability. 
B. The Second and Fifth Circuits’ Adoptions of DURA 
PHARMACEUTICALS 
In the aftermath of the Dura Pharmaceuticals decision, the Second 
and Fifth Circuits both held that the strict civil loss calculation standard it 
suggested also should apply to criminal sentencing. 
 1. The Decisions 
In 2005, the Fifth Circuit heard United States v. Olis, an appeal from 
the conviction of Jamie Olis, a tax lawyer at Dynegy Corporation, who 
had engaged in a scheme to increase the appearance of Dynegy’s 
earnings.136 The SEC uncovered the scheme and forced Dynegy to restate 
its earnings.137 The SEC also required Dynegy to publicize the SEC’s 
investigation.138 Dynergy’s share prices dropped precipitously soon 
after.139 
Olis received a 292-month sentence for his conviction.140 His 
enhanced sentence resulted from the district court’s finding that the 
scheme caused a loss of $105 million to the University of California 
Retirement System.141 The loss calculation added twenty-six levels to his 
base offense level.142 Combined with other enhancements, Olis’ final 
 
loss had to be caused by the “leaking out of relevant or related truth”); Glaser v. Enzo Biochem, Inc., 
464 F.3d 474, 479 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting that the drop in price occurring before the alleged fraud had 
been disclosed could not have been caused by the fraud). 
 134. See, e.g., In re Williams Sec. Litig. WCG Subclass, 558 F.3d 1130, 1139–40 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(finding that the expert’s failure to account for other market forces in determining loss made the 
determination run afoul of Dura Pharmaceuticals); Ray v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 482 F.3d 991, 
995 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding the plaintiffs’ failure to separate the loss caused by fraud from the loss 
caused by the overall market decline insufficient to meet Dura Pharmaceuticals’ requirements). 
 135. Besides Olis, Rutkoske, and Berger, the Tenth Circuit recently considered Dura 
Pharmaceuticals’ applicability in the insider-trading context in United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 
1075 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 136. United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 541–42 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 542. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 543. 
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offense level was forty, allowing for a range of 292 to 365 months.143 Olis 
appealed, arguing that the loss calculation was a constitutional violation 
under Booker because his sentence was dramatically increased based on 
findings other than those made by the jury.144 
The Fifth Circuit agreed that the district court failed to meet 
Booker’s requirement that lower courts “‘consider’ the guidelines before 
issuing a ‘reasonable’ sentence.”145 In particular, the Fifth Circuit found 
the district court’s method of loss calculation problematic.146 Instead of 
using the actual loss estimate required by the Guidelines, the district 
court used the university’s loss as shorthand for the losses Olis caused.147 
The Fifth Circuit opined that the district court’s method “overemphasized 
[its] discretion as factfinder at the expense of economic analysis.”148 The 
court found that though the Guidelines require only a “reasonable 
estimate of loss,” they require the calculation to account only for the loss 
the defendant caused.149 
Noting that “the civil damage measure should be the backdrop for 
criminal responsibility,” the court found that Dura Pharmaceuticals 
provided a model for civil loss calculation that was “attuned to stock 
market complexities.”150 Under that model, “there is no loss attributable 
to a misrepresentation unless and until the truth is subsequently revealed 
and the price of the stock accordingly declines.”151 Looking to Dura 
Pharmaceuticals, the Fifth Circuit outlined the proper standard for loss 
calculation as a method that eliminated the “extrinsic factors” affecting 
share price decline, thus uncovering the loss from the fraud.152 Because 
the model requires courts to strip away the effects of other market forces 
driving the price down, the Fifth Circuit found that the civil standard 
more accurately uncovers “actual loss” for the Guidelines.153 
Finding that the district court’s heuristic use of the university’s loss 
failed to account for “extrinsic factors” acting on the shares, the Fifth 
Circuit held that the district court’s loss calculation was unreasonable.154 
Olis’ expert had testified that a decline in the market had paralleled 
Dynegy’s share decline, and that the stock had begun dropping before 
news of the fraud had reached the market.155 His report raised the 
 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 544 (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005)). 
 146. Id. at 548. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 545–48. 
 149. Id. at 545, 548. 
 150. Id. at 546. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 548–49. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 548. 
 155. Id. 
Connolly_63-HLJ-567 (Do Not Delete) 1/24/2012 6:29 PM 
584 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:567 
possibility that other forces had led to Dynegy’s share drop, and that 
“attributing to Olis the entire stock market decline suffered by one large 
or multiple small shareholders . . . would greatly overstate his personal 
criminal culpability.”156 Based on this report, the Fifth Circuit vacated the 
sentence and ordered resentencing.157 
In United States v. Rutkoske, the Second Circuit also adopted Dura 
Pharmaceuticals’ reasoning for criminal sentencing.158 The court 
considered an appeal by David Rutkoske from his conviction and 
sentencing for securities fraud.159 Rutkoske was a broker who participated 
in a scheme to inflate the share price of a gambling corporation.160 He and 
his brokers spread several pieces of misinformation in their attempts to 
generate demand for the shares, and eventually the share price 
plummeted, with investors losing about $12 million.161 In calculating the 
loss, the district court followed the recommendation of an expert witness, 
who used the value of the stock three months after the conspiracy ended 
as a benchmark against which to determine the loss in value.162 The 
calculation was not tied to the disclosure of the fraud to the market.163 
Having previously expressed uneasiness with the severity of the 
sentencing in United States v. Ebbers, the Second Circuit reiterated that 
“[m]any factors may cause a decline in share price between the time of 
the fraud and the revelation of the fraud. In such cases, ‘[l]osses from 
causes other than the fraud must be excluded from the loss 
calculation.’”164 Citing approvingly to Olis, the Second Circuit held that 
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Dura Pharmaceuticals applied in loss 
calculations for criminal sentencing.165 Using that reasoning, the court 
suggested that establishing a loss for purposes of the loss calculation 
under the Guidelines requires that the fraud is disclosed to the market.166 
The court instructed lower courts to separate the loss from fraud from 
“other factors” contributing to the decline in share prices.167 The Second 
Circuit provided further guidance, noting, “Normally, expert opinion and 
some consideration of the market in general and relevant segments in 
particular will enable a sentencing judge to approximate the extent of 
loss caused by a defendant’s fraud.”168 
 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 549. 
 158. 506 F.3d 170, 179 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 159. Id. at 171. 
 160. Id. at 173. 
 161. Id.  
 162. Id. at 180. 
 163. Id.  
 164. Id. at 179 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 128 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 179–80. 
 167. See id. 
 168. Id. at 180. 
Connolly_63-HLJ-567 (Do Not Delete) 1/24/2012 6:29 PM 
January 2012]       PLAYING HOT POTATO IN THE MARKET 585 
The Second Circuit found that the district court’s method 
insufficiently accounted for the other factors affecting the drop in share 
price.169 The expert witness’s calculation attributed to Rutkoske the 
entire share price decline.170 The government’s argument that the market 
was “thin,” and therefore that the price drop was caused by the fraud, 
did not convince the court.171 The district court’s failure to tie its 
calculation to the fraud’s disclosure to the market or to account for other 
market forces affecting the drop in the share price required 
resentencing.172 
 2. Analyzing United States v. Rutkoske and United States v. Olis 
In adopting Dura Pharmaceuticals, both courts focused on the harm 
to shareholders as the basis of the defendant’s culpability. The primary 
focus in Dura Pharmaceuticals is the actual pecuniary loss to the 
shareholders,173 and the circuit courts in Rutkoske and Olis similarly 
focused on the loss shareholders sustained.174 The courts assumed that 
the harm for which defendants are liable in the civil context overlaps, or 
is even identical to, the harm for which defendants are culpable in the 
criminal context. As Dura Pharmaceuticals suggests, in the civil context, 
defendants are liable for the losses shareholders sustain after word of the 
fraud reaches the market and has affected the shares’ value.175 Rutkoske 
and Olis adopted this reasoning to find that a criminal defendant’s 
culpability rests on the loss in value shareholders sustain.176 
Conflating the loss in the civil context with the loss in the criminal 
context is the premise that drives both courts’ decisions. The Fifth Circuit 
justifies this premise by noting  the “civil damage measure . . . furnishes 
the standard of compensable injury for securities fraud victims and . . . is 
attuned to stock market complexities.”177 The Second Circuit noted that 
it saw “no reason why considerations relevant to loss causation in a civil 
fraud case should not apply, at least as strongly, to a sentencing regime in 
which the amount of loss caused by a fraud is a critical determinant of 
the length of a defendant’s sentence.”178 
 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 178. 
 171. Id. at 180. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005). 
 174. See Rutkoske, 506 F.3d at 179; United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 546 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 175. See 544 U.S. at 343–44. 
 176. See Rutkoske, 506 F.3d at 179 (noting that the calculation centers on “shareholders’ losses”); 
Olis, 429 F.3d at 546 (citing Dura Pharmaceuticals in describing the loss calculation requirements for 
sentencing). 
 177. Olis, 429 F.3d at 546. 
 178. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d at 179. 
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The decisions also import the loss-causation reasoning of Dura 
Pharmaceuticals into the assessment of loss under the Guidelines.179 The 
decisions instruct lower courts to account for other market forces in their 
analyses of losses for sentencing.180 The adoption of this reasoning reveals 
a concern with the incongruity between long sentences and the 
culpability of the defendants.181 
Interestingly, the Guidelines use loss as a way to correct a tendency 
to under-sentence white-collar criminals in comparison to their blue-
collar counterparts.182 Using the amount of loss as the primary 
enhancement appeared to render objective sentences reflecting the 
defendant’s culpability.183 As the Second Circuit noted in Ebbers, 
however, the resulting sentences in the securities fraud context are often 
longer than sentences for violent crimes.184 Because a corporation may 
have billions of shares, a small drop in share price very quickly results in 
hundreds of millions of dollars in loss.185 
By adopting the Dura Pharmaceuticals reasoning, the Second and 
Fifth Circuits attempted a more equitable correlation between the crime 
and the punishment. The decisions reflect a belief, shared in Dura 
Pharmaceuticals, that lower courts can isolate the harm caused by a 
disclosed fraud by removing other factors affecting share price until they 
have exposed the decline caused by the fraud.186 The courts recognize the 
difficulty in this proposition, noting that such isolation is neither easy nor 
exact.187 And yet, making the attempt to isolate the harm from the fraud 
 
 179. Id. at 179; Olis, 429 F.3d at 546. 
 180. See Rutkoske, 506 F.3d at 179; Olis, 429 F.3d at 548–49. 
 181. See Rutkoske, 506 F.3d at 179 (“[W]e acknowledged the complexities inherent in calculating 
the loss amount but emphasized that ‘[t]he loss must be the result of the fraud.’ Many factors may 
cause a decline in share price between the time of the fraud and the revelation of the fraud. In such 
cases, ‘[l]osses from causes other than the fraud must be excluded from the loss calculation.’” (quoting 
United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 128 (2d Cir. 2006))); Olis, 429 F.3d at 547 (“Sentencing 
decisions in these cases acknowledge that because a company’s stock price is affected before and after 
the fraud, by numerous extrinsic market influences as well as the soundness of other business decisions 
by the company, the calculation of loss attributable to securities fraud requires careful analysis.”). 
 182. Vollrath, supra note 13, at 1007. 
 183. See id. at 1007–08. 
 184. United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 129 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 185. See id. 
 186. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d at 180 (“Normally, expert opinion and some consideration of the market 
in general and relevant segments in particular will enable a sentencing judge to approximate the extent 
of loss caused by a defendant’s fraud.”); Olis, 429 F.3d at 546 (“District courts must take a ‘realistic, 
economic approach to determine what losses the defendant truly caused or intended to cause.’” 
(quoting United States v. W. Coast Aluminum Heat Treating Co., 265 F.3d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 2001))). 
 187. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d at 179 (“Determining the extent to which a defendant’s fraud, as 
distinguished from market or other forces, caused shareholders’ losses inevitably cannot be an exact 
science. The Guidelines’ allowance of a ‘reasonable estimate’ of loss remains pertinent.” (citation 
omitted)); Olis, 429 F.3d at 547 (“[G]iven the time and evidentiary constraints on the sentencing 
process, the methods adopted in these cases are necessarily less exact than the measure of damage 
applicable in civil securities litigation.”). 
Connolly_63-HLJ-567 (Do Not Delete) 1/24/2012 6:29 PM 
January 2012]       PLAYING HOT POTATO IN THE MARKET 587 
seems to ease the courts’ concerns about the disproportionality between 
culpability and punishment that can result from the Guidelines’ loss 
emphasis.188 
Still, employing the Dura Pharmaceuticals’ loss calculation 
reasoning does not prevent long sentences for defendants. As a 
hypothetical example, consider John, corporate officer for Acme 
Corporation, who issues an earnings statement that materially 
misrepresents Acme’s earnings. The next quarter, John’s over-optimism 
comes to light and he restates the earnings, admitting simultaneously that 
he engaged in fraud. Assuming the market is stable during that period, 
any change in the price results exclusively from the fraud. 
Upon disclosure, the share price drops only twenty cents, but 
because Acme has 1 billion shares,189 the “loss” from the fraud is $200 
million and adds twenty-eight levels to John’s sentence.190 Shareholder 
harm from the drop in the price depends on the number of shares each 
shareholder owns: A shareholder owning twenty percent of the shares 
suffers a $40 million loss, whereas a shareholder owning one share loses 
only twenty cents. Under the Guidelines and the Second and Fifth 
Circuit’s holdings, John’s sentence reflects the entire decline. 
Realistically, therefore, the civil loss calculation remains beholden 
to the Guidelines’ stiff penalties for large losses. Nevertheless, the 
application of the civil loss standard does imply that there is a closer 
connection between the fraud and the loss for which the defendant is 
being punished. 
C. The Ninth Circuit’s Departure 
In United States v. Berger, the Ninth Circuit faced an issue similar to 
those dealt with by the Fifth and Second Circuits but declined to adopt 
the Dura Pharmaceuticals reasoning for criminal sentencing.191 The Ninth 
Circuit’s decision reflects a different understanding of the culpability 
inherent in securities fraud. 
 1. The Decision 
The Ninth Circuit heard an appeal from Richard Berger, who 
protested his sentencing for securities fraud. Berger had continuously 
 
 188. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d at 179 (“[W]e see no reason why considerations relevant to loss causation 
in a civil fraud case should not apply, at least as strongly, to a sentencing regime in which the amount 
of loss caused by a fraud is a critical determinant of the length of a defendant’s sentence.”); Olis, 429 
F.3d at 546 (noting that the civil damages loss calculation is appropriate in the criminal context 
because it is “attuned to stock market complexities”). 
 189. This is not an unrealistic number. The Walt Disney Company, for example, has approximately 
1.86 billion shares. The Walt Disney Co. (DIS), Street, www.thestreet.com/quote/DIS.html (last 
visited Dec. 23, 2011). 
 190. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B1.1(b)(1) (2010). 
 191. 587 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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misrepresented his company’s financial health from its initial public 
offering through its eventual demise.192 He failed to report the extent of 
the company’s earnings and liabilities, instead stating in disclosures to 
the SEC that the company had sufficient earnings to cover its loans.193 In 
fact, the company was in default.194 
An audit uncovering the accounting irregularities forced the 
company to restate its earnings, leading to a sharp decline in its share 
price.195 The share price declined below NASDAQ’s requirements, 
resulting in the delisting of the company’s shares.196 News of the 
accounting irregularities and the securities fraud did not become public 
until after the company had already delisted the shares.197 The district 
court used examples of other companies with publicized accounting 
irregularities to estimate the loss from the unpublicized fraud in this 
case.198 Berger appealed, arguing that the district court should have 
applied Dura Pharmaceuticals’ economic harm and causation reasoning 
in its calculation.199 
While finding the district court’s calculation flawed, the Ninth 
Circuit disagreed that Dura Pharmaceuticals reasoning regarding 
shareholder losses applied to criminal sentencing loss calculations.200 In 
its explicit departure from the Second Circuit’s holding, the court 
reasoned Dura Pharmaceuticals was inapplicable because “the primary 
policy rationale . . . for proscribing overvaluation as a valid measure of 
loss does not apply in a criminal sanctions context.”201 
The Ninth Circuit asserted that the foundation of common law fraud 
underlying the Dura Pharmaceuticals’ requirement referred only to the 
plaintiff’s burden to show loss.202 This requirement was distinct from the 
criminal context’s concern with “the amount of loss caused, i.e., the harm 
that society as a whole suffered from the defendant’s fraud.”203 The court 
argued that an inflated purchase price represents “aggregate loss to 
society . . . even if various individual victims’ respective losses cannot be 
precisely determined or linked to the fraud.”204 
Furthermore, the court found the application of Dura 
Pharmaceuticals’ civil rule to criminal sentencing would “clash with the 
 
 192. Id. at 1040–41. 
 193. Id. at 1040. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 1040–41. 
 197. Id. at 1041. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 1042. 
 200. Id. at 1043. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 1044. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
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parallel principles in the Sentencing Guidelines, which have persuasive 
value in federal courts.”205 Looking to the 1995 version of the Guidelines, 
the Ninth Circuit noted the endorsement of overvaluation as a method of 
calculating loss from fraud.206 The court found that application of Dura 
Pharmaceuticals’ reasoning, prohibiting an inflated purchase price as a 
method of determining loss, would run directly counter to that 
endorsement.207 Moreover, the court opined that the Guidelines required 
only a “reasonable estimate of the loss” and offered broad directions 
about calculation.208 The court concluded that these directions from the 
1995 version allowed, if not condoned, overvaluation as an appropriate 
method for calculating loss.209 
Though the court rejected applying Dura Pharmaceuticals’ loss 
reasoning, it nevertheless found the district court’s calculation 
problematic.210 The district court did not determine the extent to which 
Berger’s fraud had overvalued the stock and what loss, in the form of 
overvaluation, his victims had sustained.211 Instead, the district court 
presumed the loss occurred and then used similar companies’ share price 
declines to estimate the amount of decline attributable to Berger’s 
fraud.212 The district court’s calculation was an attempt to figure out the 
percentage of the drop in share price caused by the fraud, which was 
impossible because the fraud did not become public until after the 
company delisted its shares.213 The Ninth Circuit remanded, requiring the 
district court to determine the inflation in the value of the shares caused 
by the fraud in order to determine the loss.214 
 2. Analyzing United States v. Berger 
In contrast to the Second and Fifth Circuits’ holdings, the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision rests on the proposition that harm occurs when the 
substance of the fraud enters the market, rather than when the truth 
becomes known.215 
 
 205. Id. at 1043. 
 206. Id. at 1045. The 1995 version of the Guidelines is the applicable standard because Berger’s 
fraud ended before the 2001 amendment of the Guidelines. Id. at 1044. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 1045. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 1046. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. See id. at 1044 (“[W]here the value of securities have been inflated by a defendant’s fraud, the 
defendant may have caused aggregate loss to society in the amount of the fraud-induced 
overvaluation, even if various individual victims’ respective losses cannot be precisely determined or 
linked to the fraud.”); see also Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 340 (2005); Broudo v. Dura 
Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 938 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[L]oss causation does not require pleading a stock 
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The Ninth Circuit noted that the difference between the civil and 
criminal contexts lies in the policy justifications for each. Civil litigation 
is an attempt by the shareholder to recover damages from the fraud.216 
The individualized harm to the shareholder, according to the Supreme 
Court, occurs only when the truth becomes public.217 The Ninth Circuit 
distinguished the civil harm to individual shareholders from the public 
harm resulting from the crime of securities fraud.218 The court’s holding 
suggests the harm is the overall deception of the market from the 
fraud.219 
Berger differentiated culpability for acting deceitfully from 
culpability for shareholder losses resulting from the deceit. The facts of 
Berger highlight the distinction. Berger’s fraud did not become public 
before the shares were delisted, yet he was culpable for broadcasting 
fraudulent information to the market and inflating the share prices.220 
The Ninth Circuit’s holding reflects a belief that there is an important 
difference between civil liability, where the focus is compensation, and 
criminal liability, where the focus is punishment.221 
The reasoning in Berger is not without issue. First, the Ninth Circuit 
relies on the 1995 version of the Guidelines to find that Congress 
endorsed overvaluation as a method of calculating loss.222 However, in 
the 2001 amendment of the Guidelines, the Sentencing Commission 
dropped the overvaluation preference, stating instead that a “reduction 
that resulted from the offense in the value of equity securities or other 
corporate assets” is a factor in determining loss.223 Without an 
overvaluation preference in the guidelines, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning 
for allowing price inflation to show loss is less convincing. 
In addition, critics of Berger argue the decision creates a lower 
standard of loss calculation than in the civil litigation context, where 
Dura Pharmaceuticals binds courts.224 As one critic noted, Berger “will 
 
price drop following a corrective disclosure or otherwise. It merely requires pleading that the price at 
the time of purchase was overstated and sufficient identification of the cause.”). 
 216. Berger, 587 F.3d at 1043–44. 
 217. Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 343–44. 
 218. Berger, 587 F.3d at 1044 (“[I]n a private civil fraud action, a court gauges loss from the 
perspective of the plaintiff-victim . . . . In criminal sentencing, however, a court gauges the amount of 
loss caused . . . .”). 
 219. Id. (“Criminal sentencing [considers] the harm that society as a whole suffered from the 
defendant’s fraud.”). 
 220. See id. at 1041. 
 221. See Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 455 (7th Cir. 1982) (“[The] objectives of 
tort liability . . . . are to compensate the victims of wrongdoing and to deter future wrongdoing.”); 
Note, Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 931, 936 
(1984) (noting that criminal law is concerned with societal harm as well as harm to individual victims). 
 222. Berger, 587 F.3d at 1045. 
 223. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(C)(v) (2010); see also Ramirez, supra 
note 70, at 377 (describing the 2001 amendments). 
 224. James A. Jones II, Note, United States v. Berger: The Rejection of Civil Loss Causation 
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cause further inflated sentences in securities fraud cases in which 
defendants are already subject to disproportionately high loss tables and 
multiple, redundant upward adjustments.”225 Another noted that the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision will affect “pretrial negotiations among 
prosecutors and criminal securities fraud defendants” because defendants 
could face “a potentially greater sentence based on the sentencing court’s 
calculation of loss under Berger.”226 
But these criticisms fail to take account of the distinction in Dura 
Pharmaceuticals between economic harm and loss causation.227 In Berger, 
the Ninth Circuit rejected only the Supreme Court’s reasoning that for 
harm or loss to occur there must be disclosure of the fraud to the 
market.228 It implicitly accepted the Court’s reasoning that loss must be 
the result of the fraud, noting that whether loss stems from the disclosure 
of the fraud or from price inflation, it must be the product of the fraud.229 
Berger does not permit district courts to attribute loss to the defendant 
without showing a link between the loss and the fraud; in fact, in Berger, 
the district court’s failure to make that link caused the Ninth Circuit to 
remand the case.230 
D. Reaching a Workable Loss Calculation 
A workable loss calculation must address the policies underlying the 
regime of criminal sentencing, namely that of effective deterrence and 
fair punishment. The Ninth Circuit’s approach, with certain 
modifications, more closely approaches this balance. 
Loss calculation should focus on the culpability of the defendant 
rather than on the individual harm. Disclosure of the fraud to the market 
should not be a requirement in assessing the damage caused by the 
defendant. Criminalizing securities fraud reflects society’s intolerance for 
both the inefficiencies caused by the fraud and for the harm individuals 
suffer from the fraud.231 Private civil litigation suitably provides 
 
Principles in Connection with Criminal Securities Fraud, 6 Wash. J.L. Tech. & Arts 273, 283 (2011); 
A. Jeff Ifrah & Rachel Hirsch, Circuits Split Over Securities Fraud Sentencing, Ifrah Law (July 19, 
2010), http://www.ifrahlaw.com/circuits-split-over-securities-fraud-sentencing/; Gregory L. Poe, 
Sentencing in Fraud Cases Involving Shareholder Loss, Fed. Criminal Practice Blog (Dec. 31, 2009), 
http://blog.gpoelaw.com/sentencing-in-fraud-cases-involving-shareholder-loss/. 
 225. Ifrah & Hirsch, supra note 224. 
 226. Jones, supra note 224, at 283. 
 227. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005) (noting that the inflated-purchase-
price theory would eliminate both the “economic loss” and “proximate causation” elements from a 
securities fraud cause of action). 
 228. United States v. Berger, 587 F.3d 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e decline to require, in 
finding facts relevant to sentencing, a showing that ‘share price fell significantly after the truth became 
known.’” (quoting Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 347)). 
 229. Id. at 1043 (noting the requirement that the loss be caused by the defendant’s fraud). 
 230. Id. at 1046. 
 231. See, e.g., Message from the President—Regulation of Securities Exchanges, 78 Cong. Rec. 
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shareholders with the opportunity to recover for their individual harm. 
In contrast, criminal liability reflects the government’s attempt to 
regulate the market broadly and to deter behavior that impacts the 
market beyond the harm sustained by shareholders of the affected 
company.232 
In a situation like that in Berger, where the fraud never becomes 
public, a defendant unduly benefits under Dura Pharmaceuticals by 
continuing to hide the fraud. For example, under Dura Pharmaceuticals, 
Berger might have escaped any loss enhancement for his actions. He lied 
about the company’s profitability and liabilities, but the truth—that the 
company was never profitable and had substantial debt—did not come to 
light until after the shares were delisted.233 The drop in share price 
preceding the delisting resulted from the company’s current unprofitable 
state, not from the knowledge that the company was never profitable. 
Under a Dura Pharmaceuticals analysis, such losses are not the 
result of the fraud; they are the result of the current condition of the 
company. This result is incongruous with Berger’s culpability. He is 
guilty because he misrepresented the state of his company, which led to a 
market-wide deception about the appropriate value of the company’s 
shares. Returning to the “hot potato” metaphor, Berger is responsible 
for creating the game in the first place: he started passing the potato and 
he started playing the music. Adopting the Dura Pharmaceuticals 
economic-loss reasoning means he escapes liability because people 
dropped the potato before he stopped the music. As Miriam Baer has 
noted, corporate officials already benefit from continuing the fraud; 
requiring Dura Pharmaceuticals to apply in every situation of loss 
calculation would increase that incentive.234 
A price-inflation theory allows courts to discount the mitigating 
effects on the share-price decline of the publicity surrounding the 
discovery of the fraud.235 Information about the investigation may cause 
share-price decline before the truth itself becomes public.236 The decline 
after the broadcasting of the fraud may be much less than the overall 
 
2264–72 (1934), reprinted in 4 Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933 & Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, at 2264 (2001) (“I therefore recommend to the Congress the enactment of 
legislation providing for the regulation by the Federal Government of the operations of exchanges 
dealing in securities and commodities for the protection of investors, for the safeguarding of values, 
and, so far as it may be possible, for the elimination of unnecessary, unwise, and destructive 
speculation.”). 
 232. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2010); cf. Prentice, supra note 42, at 830 (“[S]tringent securities laws 
shape morals and behavior.”). 
 233. Berger, 587 F.3d at 1040–41. 
 234. See Baer, supra note 37, at 1362 (“[Dura Pharmaceuticals] unwittingly perpetuates the 
corporate executive’s naïve hope that better information will surface in the future and thereby 
counteract the fraud.”). 
 235. Fisch, supra note 98, at 848–49. 
 236. See id. 
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drop in the share price or than the inflation of the value of the shares 
because of the fraud.237 Under Dura Pharmaceuticals, district courts 
remove these “extrinsic factors” from their calculation of the loss.238 This 
process incentivizes defendants to time disclosure of the fraud until the 
prices have dropped independently, either from the investigation or from 
outside market forces.239 
The Commission should amend the Guidelines to again endorse 
overvaluation as a method of calculating loss. This step would more 
closely align the Guidelines with the culpability of white-collar 
defendants and would provide greater guidance to courts in assessing 
loss. Alternatively, the Supreme Court should address the circuits’ 
dispute by allowing price inflation as a means of determining loss under 
the guidelines. 
While the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning more accurately accounts for 
the government’s interests in regulating the markets, Berger fails to 
provide a sufficiently rigorous framework for calculating loss under a 
price-inflation theory. Whether the Commission amends the Guidelines 
or the Supreme Court accepts the price-inflation theory, courts should 
explicitly adopt the causation reasoning in Dura Pharmaceuticals and 
require expert testimony and examination of the inflated purchase-price 
numbers by district courts. Nevertheless, a price-inflation theory actually 
parallels modern finance theory more closely than the Dura 
Pharmaceuticals reasoning and may prove to be more workable.240 
Even if the Commission fails to amend the Guidelines, a price-
inflation theory works within the current Guidelines. The Guidelines 
allow courts to use gain as a determinate of loss where “there is a loss but 
it reasonably cannot be determined.”241 If the market does not discover 
the truth while shares remain on the exchange, it is nearly impossible to 
determine the reduction in the shares’ value that resulted from the fraud. 
In those situations, price inflation is a valid method for calculating the 
gain a defendant earned from his fraud. 
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, even if modified and rigorously 
examined, may result in long sentences for white-collar criminals. The 
Guidelines, as the product of Congress’s powers, reflect a policy decision 
to assign securities fraud defendants lengthy sentences based on their 
culpability.242 The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning more closely aligns with that 
policy. 
 
 237. Id. 
 238. See supra note 134. 
 239. Fisch, supra note 98, at 852. 
 240. Id. at 845. 
 241. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(B) (2010). 
 242. See supra note 85 and accompanying text; see also Vollrath, supra note 13, at 1020–23. 
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Conclusion 
Congress passed the Exchange Act over eighty years ago with the 
intent of providing reliable markets for the American population. To 
ensure that benefit, Congress has authorized criminal liability for 
particularly culpable behavior in violations of the Act. Securities fraud 
destabilizes markets and injures individual shareholders through the 
spread of false information, and Congress has signaled the seriousness of 
committing securities fraud by providing a twenty-year statutory 
maximum sentence. 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Berger accords more closely with 
Congress’s intentions. By targeting the culpable behavior rather than 
individual loss, the Ninth Circuit has closed a loophole under the 
Guidelines: Defendants cannot hide their fraudulent behavior and 
fortuitously disclose it only when the shares have declined from other 
causes. Combined with a rigorous standard for causation, price inflation 
is an appropriate means to establish loss under the Guidelines. The 
Commission should amend the Guidelines to reflect that fact. 
 
